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Not long ago futures trading was limited to con-
tracts for agricultural and other commodities. Trad-
ing in futures contracts for financial instruments
began in the early 1970s, after almost a decade of
accelerating inflation exposed market participants to
unprecedented levels of exchange rate and interest
rate risk. Foreign currency futures, introduced in
1972 by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, were the
first financial futures contracts to be traded. The
first interest rate futures contract, a contract for the
future delivery of mortgage certificates issued by
the Government National Mortgage Association,
began trading on the floor of the Chicago Board of
Trade in 1975. Today financial futures are among
the most actively traded of all futures contracts.
At present there are active futures markets for
two different money market instruments: three-
month Treasury bills and three-month Eurodollar
time deposits. Treasury bill futures were introduced
by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1976, while
trading in Eurodollar futures began late in 1981.
Domestic certificate of deposit futures were also
actively traded for a time but that market, while
technically still active, became dormant for all prac-
tical purposes in 1986.
AN INTRODUCTION TO FUTURES MARKETS
A futures contract is a standardized, transferable
agreement to buy or sell a given commodity or finan-
cial instrument on a specified future date at a set
price. In a futures transaction the buyer (sometimes
called the long) agrees to purchase and the seller (or
short) to deliver a specified item according to the
terms of the contract. For example, the buyer of a
Treasury bill contract commits himself to purchase
at some specified future date a thirteen-week Trea-
sury bill paying a rate of interest negotiated at the
time the contract is purchased. In contrast, a cash
or spot market transaction simultaneously prices and
transfers physical ownership of the item being sold.
A cash commodity (cash security) refers to the actual
physical commodity (security) as distinguished from
the futures commodity.
This article was prepared for Instruments of the Money
Market, 6th edition.
Futures contracts are traded on organized ex-
changes. The basic function of a futures exchange is
to set and enforce trading rules. There are thirteen
futures exchanges in the United States at present.
The principal exchanges are found in Chicago and
New York. Short-term interest rate futures trade
on a number of exchanges; however, the most active
trading in these contracts takes place at the Inter-
national Monetary Market (IMM) division of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).
Market Participants
Futures market participants are typically divided
into two categories : hedgers and speculators. Hedg-
ing refers to a futures market transaction made as a
temporary substitute for a spot market transaction to
be made at a later date. The purpose of hedging is
to take advantage of current prices in future trans-
actions. In the money market, hedgers use interest
rate futures to fix future borrowing and lending rates.
Futures market speculation involves assuming
either a short or long futures position solely to profit
from price changes, and not in connection with ordi-
nary commercial pursuits. A dentist who buys wheat
futures after hearing of a nuclear disaster in the
Soviet Union is speculating that wheat prices will
rise, while a grain dealer undertaking the same trans-
action would be hedging unless the futures position
is out of proportion with anticipated future wheat
purchases.
Characteristics of Futures Contracts
Three distinguishing characteristics are common to
all futures contracts. First, a futures contract intro-
duces the element of time into a transaction. Second,
futures contracts are standardized agreements. Each
futures exchange determines the specifications of the
contracts traded on the exchange so that all contracts
for a given item specify the same delivery location
and a uniform deliverable grade. Traded contracts
must also specify one of a limited number of desig-
nated delivery dates (also called contract maturity or
settlement dates). The only item negotiated at the
time of a futures transaction is price. Third, the
exchange clearinghouse interposes itself as a counter-
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concluded, a buyer and seller need never deal with
one another again; their contractual obligations are
with the clearinghouse. The clearinghouse, in turn,
guarantees contract performance for both parties.
The first of these characteristics is not unique to
futures contracts. A forward contract, like a futures
contract, is a formal commitment between two parties
specifying the terms of a transaction to be undertaken
at a future date. Unlike futures contracts, however,
forward contracts are not standardized; rather, they
are custom-tailored agreements. As a general rule
forward contracts are not transferable and so cannot
be traded to a third party.
Trading in futures contracts is facilitated by con-
tract standardization and the clearinghouse guaran-
tee. Contract standardization reduces transaction
costs. The clearinghouse guarantee removes credit
risk, or risk that a party to the contract will fail to
honor contractual commitments. These two char-
acteristics make all contracts for the same item and
maturity date perfect substitutes for one another so
that a party to a futures contract can always liqui-
date a futures commitment (or open position) before
maturity by making an offsetting transaction. For
example, a trader with a long position in Treasury
bill futures maturing in March of 1987 can liquidate
his position any time before the last day of trading
by selling an equal number of March Treasury bill
futures. In practice, most futures contracts are
liquidated in this way before they mature. By one
estimate two percent of all futures contracts are held
to maturity on average, although delivery is more
common in some markets.
1
Margin Requirements
A contract for the future delivery of an item gains
value to one of the parties to the contract and im-
poses a liability on the other when futures prices
change. A rise in Treasury bill futures prices, for
example, gives all traders who are long in bill futures
the right to buy Treasury bills at a price below the
currently prevailing futures price; equivalently, they
have the right to invest money at an interest rate
higher than the current market rate. Traders with
short positions, on the other hand, are committed to
sell bills at a price lower than that which they would
be required to pay if they wished to buy the contract
back at the new futures price.
1 See Little [1984, p. 43].
In the early days of trading in time contracts, as
they were called in the nineteenth century, traders
adversely affected by price movements often disap-
peared as the delivery date drew near. In response,
futures exchanges adopted the practice of requiring a
performance bond, called a margin requirement, of all
buyers and sellers. They also began requiring all
traders to recognize any gains or losses on their out-
standing futures positions at the end of each trading
session, a practice called marking to market.
All futures exchanges now require members to
maintain margin accounts. Brokers who execute
orders on behalf of customers are required to collect
margin deposits from them before undertaking any
trades. Minimum margin requirements are set by
the exchanges. Brokers can, and most do, require
their customers to maintain margins higher than the
minimum levels set by the exchange. Any gains or
losses realized when the contracts are marked to
market at the end of a trading session are added
to or subtracted from a trader’s margin account.
If the margin account balance falls below a specified
minimum, called the maintenance margin, the trader
faces a margin call requiring the deposit of addi-
tional margin money, called variation margin, to his
account.
Futures Exchanges
The right to conduct transactions on the floor of a
futures exchange is typically limited to exchange
members, although trading privileges can be leased
to another party. Members also have voting rights,
which give them a voice in management decisions.
Membership privileges can be bought and sold; the
exchanges make public the most recent selling and
current offer price for a membership.
Exchange members can be grouped into two cate-
gories. Commission brokers (also known as floor
brokers) execute orders for nonmembers and other
customers, Some floor brokers are employees of
commission firms while others are independent oper-
ators who execute trades for other firms. The second
type of exchange member is the floor trader, or local.
Locals are independent operators who trade for their
own account.
2
2 Different types of floor traders can be distinguished
based on the trading strategies they use most often: see
Rothstein and Little [1984] for a description. Silber
[1984] presents a comprehensive analysis of marketmaker
behavior in futures markets.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 13The Role of the Exchange Clearinghouse
Each futures exchange operates a clearing organi-
zation, or clearinghouse, that records all transactions
and insures all buy and sell trades match. The clear-
inghouse also assures the financial integrity of the
contracts traded on the exchange by guaranteeing
contract performance and supervising the process of
delivery for contracts held to maturity.
Clearing member firms act as intermediaries be-
tween traders on the floor of the exchange and the
clearinghouse, assisting in recording transactions and
collecting required margin deposits. Clearing mem-
ber firms are all members of the exchange, but not
all exchange members are clearing members. All
transactions taking place on the exchange floor must
be cleared through a clearing member firm. Traders
who are not directly affiliated with a clearing member
must make arrangements with one to act as a desig-
nated clearing agent.
Clearing member firms are responsible for collect-
ing margin deposits from their customers and de-
positing required margins with the clearinghouse.
The clearinghouse holds clearing members respon-
sible for losses incurred by their customers. Any
time a trader fails to meet a margin call his position
is immediately liquidated, with the resulting losses
taken from his margin account. If losses exceed
funds available in a customer’s margin account the
clearing member firm is required to make up the
difference to the clearinghouse.
Futures Commission Merchants
A Futures Commission Merchant (FCM) is an
intermediary that handles orders for the sale or pur-
chase of a futures contract from the general public.
An FCM can be a person or a firm. Some FCMs
are exchange members employing their own floor
brokers; others rely on independent brokers to handle
trades ordered by their customers. An FCM is
responsible for collecting the required margin deposit
from customers before acting to execute a trade. The
FCM must in turn deposit the required margin with
its clearing agent. All FCMs must be licensed by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
which is the government agency responsible for regu-
lating futures markets.
TREASURY BILL FUTURES
Treasury bills are short-term securities issued by
the U. S. Treasury to help finance the federal govern-
ment. Bills with maturities of thirteen, twenty-six,
and fifty-two weeks are issued by the Treasury on a
regular basis. The secondary market for these securi-
ties is active and well-organized, making Treasury
bills (often referred to as T-bills) among the most
liquid of money market instruments,
Treasury bill futures contracts are traded in the
United States on two Chicago exchanges: the Inter-
national Monetary Market (IMM) and the Mid-
America Commodity Exchange. Both contracts
specify delivery of thirteen-week (91-day) bills. The
IMM T-bill contract, which is the most actively
traded of the two by a large margin, is described
below.
Contract Specifications
Upon maturity the IMM contract requires the
seller to deliver a U. S. Treasury bill with a $1 mil-
lion face value and thirteen weeks left to maturity.
Contracts for delivery during the months of March,
June, September, and December are traded on the
exchange. At any one time contracts for eight differ-
ent delivery dates are traded. A new contract begins
trading after each delivery date, making the furthest
delivery date for a new contract twenty-four months
away.
Price Quotation Treasury bills do not pay explicit
interest. Instead, they are sold at a discount relative
to their redemption or face value. The difference
between the purchase price of a Treasury bill and its
face value determines the interest earned by a buyer.
Treasury bill yields are typically quoted on a discount
basis, that is, as a percentage of face value rather
than of actual funds invested.
3
Price quotations for T-bill futures contracts are
based on an index devised by the IMM. The index
is calculated by subtracting the Treasury bill discount
yield from 100. For example, if the discount yield
on a traded T-bill futures contract is 9.75 percent,
then the index value is 100 - 9.75 = 90.25. Index
values move in the same direction as the future pur-
chase price of the deliverable bill ; a rise in the index
value, for example, means that the price a buyer must
agree to pay to take future delivery of a T-bill has
risen.
3 The formula for calculating the discount yield is
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trading floor is one basis point (.01 percent), which
comes to $25 on a contract specifying the delivery
of a 90-day Treasury bill with a $1 million face value.
Thus, the price of a T-bill futures contract may be
quoted as 94.25, or 94.26, but not 94.255. The IMM
eliminated maximum daily price limits for all its
interest rate futures contracts in December of 1985.
A sample of a newspaper clipping reporting Trea-
sury bill futures prices is reproduced in Box 1.
Delivery Requirements The Treasury auctions
thirteen- and twenty-six-week bills each Monday
(except for holidays and special situations) and
issues them on the following Thursday. Fifty-two-
week bills are auctioned every four weeks. These
auctions are held on a Thursday and the bills are
issued on the following Thursday. To insure an ade-
quate supply of deliverable bills, the IMM schedules
T-bill futures delivery dates for the three successive
business days beginning with the first day of the
contract month on which a thirteen-week bill is issued
and a one-year bill has thirteen weeks to maturity.
This schedule permits delivery requirements for the
T-bill futures contract to be satisfied with either a
newly issued thirteen-week bill or an original-issue
twenty-six- or fifty-two-week bill with thirteen weeks
Box 1
FOLLOWING DAILY FUTURES MARKET ACTIVITY
Many newspapers report information on
daily trading activity in futures markets. The
clipping for IMM Treasury bill futures repro-
duced below is taken from the October 3, 1986,
edition of the Wall Street Journal.
Each row gives price and trading volume
data for a different contract delivery month.
Delivery months for currently traded contracts
are listed in the first column.
The next four columns show the opening
price, high and low prices, and the closing or
settlement price for the previous day’s trading.
Column six gives the change in the contract
settlement price over the last two trading
sessions.
The seventh column reports the interest rate
implied by the most recent settlement price,
calculated by subtracting the settlement price
from 100.
Column eight reports the change in the inter-
est rates implied by the two most recent settle-
ment prices. Note that the figures in this
column are equal in magnitude but opposite in
sign to the change in settlement price displayed
in the sixth column.
The last column lists open interest for each
contract delivery month. Open interest refers
to the number of outstanding contracts. Each
unit represents both a buyer and a seller with
an outstanding futures commitment, or open
position. Notice that open interest is greatest
for the nearest delivery month and declines
steadily for successively distant delivery months.
This pattern is typical, except when delivery
for the nearby contract is impending and market
participants begin to close out their positions.
Total trading volume and open interest for all
contract delivery months are given in the last
line. Trading volume refers to the total number
of contracts for all contract delivery months
traded on a particular day. Each transaction
included in the count reflects both a purchase
and sale of a futures contract. Note that the
clipping includes data on total trading volume
for each of the previous two trading sessions.
Total open interest, reported in the last line,
is simply the sum of the open interest for each
contract month listed in the rightmost column.
The final entry on the bottom line reports the
change in open interest over the previous two
trading sessions.
Reprinted by permission of Wall Street Journal,
© Dow Jones & Company, Inc. 1986.
All Rights Reserved.
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final delivery price is described in Box 2.
Market History
The IMM introduced the three-month Treasury
bill futures contract in January of 1976. At the time
the contract was introduced, trading in interest rate
futures was still a relatively new development. Trad-
ing in the first interest rate futures contract, the
Board of Trade’s Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA) certificate contract, had begun
only a few months earlier, The Treasury bill con-
tract was the first futures contract for a money
market instrument.
Dealers in U. S. government securities were among
the first market participants to actively use Treasury
bill futures. Other money market participants entered
into futures trading more slowly. By the time the
IMM contract was two years old, however, trading
activity had begun to accelerate rapidly.
This trend can be seen in Charts 1 and 2, which
plot two different measures of market activity for the
IMM contract from the inception of trading in 1976
through the end of 1984. The first measure, plotted
in Chart 1, is total monthly trading volume, which
is a count of the total number of contracts (not the
dollar value) traded for all contract delivery months.
Each recorded trade reflects one buyer and one seller.
Chart 2 plots total month-end open interest for all
contract delivery months. Month-end open interest
is a count of the number of unsettled contracts as of
the end of the last trading day of a given month.
Each contract included in the open interest count
reflects both a buyer and a seller with an outstanding
futures commitment.
EURODOLLAR FUTURES
Eurodollars are U. S. dollar-denominated deposits
held with banks or bank branches located outside of
the United States, or with International Banking
Facilities (IBFs) inside the United States
4 There
are two types of Eurodollar deposits : nontransferable
time deposits and CDs. Time deposits make up the
4 An International Banking Facility, or IBF, is an office
of a U. S. bank, U. S. branch of a foreign bank, or Edge
Act corporation, which is domiciled in the United States
but operates under rules and regulations similar to those
applied to foreign branches of U. S. banks.
restricted to doing business with foreign residents, foreign
banks and foreign branches of U. S. banks, and foreign
operations of multinational firms. See Key [1982] for
further details.
bulk of the Eurodollar market. These deposits have
fixed maturities ranging from one day to five years;
most are very short-term, three months being a
common maturity. Eurodollar CDs are also most
commonly issued with maturities under a year.
Eurodollar futures contracts are actively traded on
two exchanges. In the United States, a three-month
Eurodollar time deposit contract is traded at the
IMM. A similar contract is also traded at the London
International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE).
The IMM contract is described below.
Contract Specifications
Technically, the buyer of a Eurodollar contract is
required to place $1,000,000 in a three-month Euro-
dollar time deposit paying the contracted rate of
interest on the contract maturity date. This re-
quirement exists only in principle, however, because
the Eurodollar contract is cash. settled. Cash settle-
ment means that actual physical delivery never takes
place; instead, any net changes in the value of the
contract at maturity are settled in cash on the basis
of spot market Eurodollar rates. Thus, cash settle-
ment can be viewed as a final marking to market of
the contract with the settlement amount based on the
difference between the previous day’s closing price
and the final settlement price.
Price Quotation Price quotations for Eurodollar
futures are based on a price index similar to that
used for Treasury bill futures. Unlike Treasury bills,
Eurodollar time deposits (as well as domestic and
Eurodollar CDs) pay explicit interest. The rate of
interest paid on the face amount of such a deposit is
termed an add-on yield because the depositor receives
the face amount of the deposit plus an explicit interest
payment when the deposit matures. In the case of
Eurodollar time deposits, the add-on yield is com-
monly called the London Interbank Offered Rate
(LIBOR), which is the interest rate at which major
international banks offer to place Eurodollar deposits
with one another. Like other money market rates,
LIBOR is an annualized rate based on a 360-day
year. The IMM Eurodollar futures price index is
100 minus the LIBOR for Eurodollar futures.
Determination of Settlement Price When a fu-
tures contract contains provisions for physical de-
livery, market forces cause the futures price to
converge to the spot market price as the delivery date
draws near. This phenomenon is called convergence.
In the case of a cash-settled contract, the futures ex-
change forces the process of convergence to take place
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EXAMPLE OF A TREASURY BILL FUTURES TRANSACTION
Suppose that on October 2, 1986, a trader buys one December 1986 Treasury
bill futures contract at the opening price of 94.83. Once the transaction is complete
the trader is contractually obligated to buy a $1 million dollar (face value) thirteen-
week Treasury bill yielding 100 - 94.83 = 5.17 percent on a discount basis on the
contract delivery date, which is December 18, 1986. At the time of the initial trans-
action, however, the trader pays only a commission and deposits the required
margin with his broker.
Effects of Price Changes The Wall Street Journal entry in Box 1 shows that
futures prices fell two basis points during that day’s trading session, meaning that
the discount rate on bills for future delivery rose after the contract was purchased.
Since each one basis point change in the T-bill index is worth $25 the trader would
lose $50 if he were to sell the contract at the closing price.
The practice of marking futures contracts to market at the end of each trading
session means that the trader is forced to realize this loss even though he does not
sell the bill; thus, he has $50 subtracted from his margin account. That money is
then transferred to a seller’s margin account. After the contract is marked to market,
the trader is still obliged to buy a Treasury bill on December 18, but now at a
discount yield of 5.19 percent (the implied futures discount yield as of the close of
trading).
Final Settlement If the trader chooses to hold his contract to maturity the
contract is marked to market `one last time at the close of the last day of trading.
All longs with open positions at that time must be prepared to buy the deliverable
bill at a purchase price determined by the closing futures index price.
The final settlement or purchase price implied by the IMM index value is deter-
mined as follows. First, calculate the total discount from the face value of the bill
using the formula
Discount = Days to Maturity x ((100 - Index) x .01) x $1,000,000
360 ,
where ((100 - Index) x .01) is the futures discount yield expressed as a fraction.
Second, calculate the purchase price by subtracting the total discount from the face
value of the deliverable bill. Note that this is essentially the same procedure used to
calculate the purchase price of a bill from the quoted discount yield in the spot
market, the only difference being the use of the futures discount rate implied by the
index value in place of the spot market rate.
Suppose that the final index price is 94.81; then, the settlement price for the
first delivery day is
$986,880.83 = $1,000,000 - 91 x .0519 x $1,000,000 .
360
This calculation assumes that the deliverable bill will have exactly 91 days to
maturity, which will always be the case on the first contract delivery day except in
special cases when a bill would otherwise mature on a national holiday.
Because buying a futures contract during the last trading session is essentially
equivalent to buying a Treasury bill in the spot market, futures prices tend to
converge to the spot market price of the deliverable security on the final day of
trading in a futures contract. Thus, the final futures discount yield should differ
little, if at all, from the spot market discount yield at the end of the final trading day.
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equal to the spot market price at the end of the last to arrive at the LIBOR rate used for final settlement.
day of trading.
To determine the final settlement price for its
Eurodollar futures contract, the Mercantile Exchange
clearinghouse randomly polls twelve banks actively
participating in the London Eurodollar market at two
different times during the last day of trading: once
at a randomly selected time during the last 90 minutes
of trading and once at the close of trading. The two
highest and lowest price quotes from each polling
The final settlement price is 100 minus the average
of the LIBOR rates for the two sample times.
As with Treasury bill futures, every change of one
basis point in the Eurodollar futures index price is
worth twenty-five dollars. Thus, if the IMM price
index rises 10 basis points during the last trading
session all shorts have $250 per contract subtracted
from their margin accounts while the longs each
receive $250 per contract. Once the contracts are
Chart 1
MONTHLY VOLUME TOTALS FOR MONEY MARKET FUTURES
Thousands of Contracts
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
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are relieved of the responsibility of actually placing
or taking the deposits specified by the contract.
The IMM Eurodollar contract is the first futures
contract traded in the United States to rely exclu-
sively on a cash settlement procedure. The LIFFE
Eurodollar contract also relies principally on cash
settlement, although it does have provisions for
physical delivery.
5
6 Tompkins and Youngren [1983] contains a detailed
comparison of the IMM and LIFFE contracts.
Trading in the IMM Eurodollar contract began in
December 1981. The LIFFE introduced its Euro-
dollar contract a few months later in September of
1982. Both markets are currently active. Trading
activity in the IMM contract is much heavier than
in the LIFFE contract, however.
6 Charts 1 and 2
6 As of the end of trading on October 2, 1986, for
example, total volume and open interest for the IMM
contract were 44,378 and 217,542 contracts, while trading
volume for the LIFFE contract was 3,454 and open
interest was 23,541.
Chart 2
MONTH-END OPEN INTEREST TOTALS FOR
MONEY MARKET FUTURES
Thousands of Contracts
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
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Last Day of Trading
March, June, September, December
Index: 100 minus discount yield
.01 percent (1 basis point=$25)
7:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.
(last day - 10:00 a.m.)
The day before the first delivery date
March, June, September, December
Index: 100 minus add-on yield
.01 percent (1 basis point = $25)
7:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.
(last day - 9:30 a.m.)
Second London business day before the
third Wednesday of delivery month
Last day of trading Delivery Days Three successive business days
beginning with the first day of the
contract month on which a thirteen-
week T-bill is issued and a one-year
bill has thirteen weeks to maturity
Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange
display monthly time series of total trading volume
and open interest for the IMM Eurodollar contract
through the end of 1984.
Three factors have contributed to the popularity of
Eurodollar futures. First, most major international
banks rely heavily on Eurodollar market for short-
term funds. To maintain ready access to this market,
many of these banks have become active market-
makers in Eurodollar deposits. Eurodollar futures
provide a means of hedging interest rate risk arising
from these activities.
Second, major international corporations have
come to rely increasingly on Eurodollar markets for
borrowed funds. Borrowing rates for these corpora-
tions are typically based on the three- or six-month
LIBOR. When loans are priced this way, Eurodollar
futures offer a means of hedging borrowing costs.
Finally, Eurodollar and domestic CD futures dis-
play almost identical price characteristics, which
means that the two contracts are virtually perfect
substitutes as hedging instruments.
7 The physical
delivery requirements for CD futures proved to be
awkward in comparison with the cash-settled Euro-
dollar contract, however, causing U. S. banks, once
among the heaviest users of CD futures, to rely
7 Faux [1984] found the correlation between Eurodollar
and CD futures prices to be .993.
instead on Eurodollar futures to hedge domestic bor-
rowing costs. In fact, the steep rise in trading volume
in the Eurodollar contract during 1984 evident in
Chart 1 coincides with a decline in CD futures trad-
ing volume beginning at about the same time. Thus,
it appears that the success of the Eurodollar contract
has contributed to the demise of trading in CD
futures.
USES OF INTEREST RATE FUTURES:
HEDGING AND SPECULATION
Hedging Theory
In the most general terms hedging refers to the act
of matching one risk with a counterbalancing risk so
as to reduce the overall risk of loss. Futures hedging
was traditionally viewed narrowly as the use of fu-
tures contracts to offset the risk of loss resulting from
price changes. To illustrate, consider the example of
an investor with holdings of interest-bearing securi-
ties. If market interest rates rise, the value of those
securities will fall. Since futures prices tend to move
in sympathy with spot market prices, taking on a
short position in interest rate futures produces an
opposing risk. Traders with short positions in
interest rate futures profit when interest rates rise
because the contracts give them the right to sell the
20 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1986underlying security at the old, higher price, meaning
that they can buy back the contracts at a profit.
This traditional view emphasized risk avoidance-
futures hedging was seen solely as providing a form
of insurance against price risk. The contemporary
view of hedging, on the other hand, emphasizes the
relative efficiency of futures markets. Buying or
selling futures contracts is a good temporary substi-
tute for planned spot market transactions because
futures contracts are more liquid than cash securities
and transaction costs are generally lower in futures
markets. From this perspective, the hedging trans-
action described above can be viewed as a temporary
substitute for selling existing holdings of interest-
bearing securities and buying shorter-term securities
whose value would be less affected by interest rate
changes. Either transaction would reduce the risk
faced by the investor, but the futures hedge does so
at a lower cost.
Hedging as Profit-Maximizing Behavior The
principal shortcoming of the traditional concept of
hedging is that it does not explain the hedging be-
havior of profit-maximizing firms. Although all
firms must bear some risk inherent to the normal
conduct of business, it is widely recognized that firms
seek to maximize profits, and not to minimize risk.
While risk minimization is not generally consistent
with profit-maximizing behavior, cost minimization
is. This is not to deny that hedging transactions are
undertaken to reduce risk ; hedging is one tool used in
implementing a broader policy of risk management.
The hedging behavior of profit-maximizing firms is
best understood, however, when hedging is viewed
as a temporary, low-cost alternative to planned spot
market transactions rather than as a form of price
insurance.
8
The emphasis that modern hedging theory places
on transaction costs is especially useful in under-
standing the hedging behavior of money market
participants. In the money market, investors inter-
ested only in minimizing risk need not hedge ; they
can simply hold a portfolio composed solely of T-bills
that are close to maturity. Arbitrage pricing theory
holds that two securities that can serve as perfect
substitutes should earn identical rates of return, so
that a perfectly hedged, and therefore riskless, port-
8 The concept of hedging as profit-maximizing behavior
was developed by Working [1962]. Telser [1981, 1986]
takes a similar view, arguing that futures markets exist
primarily because they minimize transaction costs, and
not because futures contracts can be used to insure
against price risk.
folio would be expected to earn only the riskless rate
of return. Most investors, however, are willing to
bear some additional risk in exchange for a higher
expected rate of return. Hedgers in the money
market selectively buy and sell interest rate futures to
fix future borrowing and lending rates when they
perceive it to be to their advantage to do so, and not
to minimize risk per se.
9
Portfolio hedging theory views futures contracts in
the context of a hedger’s entire portfolio of cash
holdings. With this approach, cash holdings are
treated as fixed and the expected returns of the un-
hedged portfolio are compared with those of a hedged
portfolio. To the extent that futures prices are corre-
lated with the value of the unhedged portfolio, a
hedge can reduce portfolio risk. Final hedging posi-
tions are determined by the desired risk-return




Basis refers to the difference between the spot
market price of the security being hedged and the
futures price. In portfolio hedging applications, basis
can also refer to the relationship between the value of
the portfolio and the price of a futures contract.
Basis risk refers to the risk hedgers face as a result
of unexpected changes in basis.
In a perfect hedge any gains or losses resulting
from a change in the price of the item being hedged
is offset by an equal and opposite change in futures
prices. Perfect futures hedges are rarely attainable
in practice because futures contracts are not custom-
tailored agreements. Contract standardization, while
contributing to the liquidity of the futures markets,
practically insures that those contracts will not be
perfectly suited to the needs of any one hedger. As a
result, hedgers are exposed to basis risk.
At least two sources of basis risk can be identified.
First, because standardized delivery dates for futures
9 Although these hedging concepts have gained wide-
spread acceptance among market participants and regu-
latory agencies such as the CFTC, bank regulatory
agencies define permissible hedges in terms of risk
reduction. Federally insured banks and savings and loan
associations are permitted to buy and sell futures for
their own accounts only when the transactions can be
shown to reduce overall risk; see Koppenhaver [1984] for
more details.
10 Powers and Vogel [1981, chapter [4] contains an
introductory discussion of portfolio hedging theory.
Figlewski [1986] contains a formal development of the
portfolio approach to hedging, including methods for
determining a risk-minimizing hedge.
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dates, most hedgers must unwind their futures posi-
tions before the contract delivery date. Futures
prices do not always move in perfect conformity with
spot prices before the contract maturity date, how-
ever, most often for fundamental economic reasons
but sometimes for reasons that are not fully under-
stood. Thus, any changes in the value of the futures
contracts held as a hedge may not fully reflect
changes in the spot price of the item being hedged at
the time the hedge is lifted. If the date of a planned
spot market transaction coincided exactly with the
corresponding futures contract delivery date, delivery
of the underlying cash instrument would permit a
hedger to avoid this source of basis risk.
Second, in most cases the grade of the commodity
being hedged differs from the deliverable grade speci-
fied by the futures contract. Price differentials be-
tween different commodity grades can vary, exposing
hedgers to basis risk. This problem is not limited to
commodity futures, moreover. Interest rate differ-
entials on bank deposits, reflecting different risk
premiums, can vary even among major money-center
banks.
As long as changes in futures prices are highly
correlated with changes in underlying cash prices a
futures hedge can reduce overall risk. Hedging
cannot eliminate basis risk, however, For this reason,
it is often said that hedging replaces price risk with
basis risk.
Cross Hedging
Futures markets do not exist for all financial in-
struments. Cross hedging refers to the use of a
futures contract for the delivery of one security to
hedge an anticipated future transaction in a different
security. An example of a popular cross hedge in
the money market is the use of Eurodollar futures to
hedge transactions in domestic CDS.
Futures prices tend to be more highly correlated
with the price of the deliverable security than with
other securities ; as a result, a cross hedge will carry
more basis risk than a regular hedge. When choos-
ing a futures contract for a cross-hedging application,
hedgers try to pick the futures contract for which
price changes are most highly correlated with price
changes of the security being hedged.
Examples of Interest Rate Hedging Strategies
A wide variety of interest rate hedging strategies
have been devised in the few years since interest rate
futures were first introduced. Interest rate futures
can be used to establish interest rates on anticipated
future investments and borrowing rates on future
loans. Financial intermediaries, such as banks, use
interest rate futures to protect their balance sheets
from adverse effects of changes in market rates.
Examples of different hedging strategies are briefly
described below.
The Long Hedge A long hedge involves buying
futures contracts, or assuming a long futures position.
Investors use long hedges to protect against falling
interest rates by fixing interest rates on future in-
vestments. One way to think of a long hedge is as a
transaction that lengthens the effective maturity of
holdings of interest-bearing securities. This is illus-
trated by the following example.
Suppose a corporate cash manager is instructed to
invest $10 million in Treasury bills until the firm
anticipates needing the funds again in six months.
The manager can fix the rate of return earned over
this period in advance either by buying six-month
bills or by simultaneously buying three-month bills
and bill futures. The latter strategy of putting on a
long futures hedge creates a synthetic six-month
Treasury bill.
To take a simplified example suppose the date is
September 18, 1986, exactly 91 days before the first
delivery date for December Treasury bill futures.
Six-month bills can be purchased at a discount yield
of 5.42 percent. Creating a synthetic six-month bill
would require the simultaneous purchase of a three-
month Treasury bill and a futures contract for the
delivery of a three-month bill on December 18.
Three-month bills sell at a 5.23 percent discount yield
and the discount yield for December bill futures is
5.36 percent. Buying an actual six-month bill turns
out to be the more profitable alternative in this ex-
ample (all numbers used in this example, incidentally,
reflect actual closing prices for September 18, 1986);
however, putting together a synthetic Treasury bill
can sometimes produce a higher yield than buying a
longer-term bill in the spot market.
11 Another Po-
tential advantage to the futures hedge is that it can
easily be lifted if market rates begin to rise.
A drawback to using the futures strategy comes
from exposure to basis risk. In the above example
the date of the initial transaction was chosen so as to
fall exactly 91 days before the maturity date of De-
cember Treasury bill futures contracts. This does not
always occur in practice.
11 
See Werderits [1983], for example.
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above example could have used another method to
create a synthetic six-month bill. Instead of buying
three-month bills and a futures contract for delivery
in three months he could buy nine-month Treasury
bills and simultaneously sell March 1987 bill con-
tracts. Selling the futures contracts effectively
shortens the maturity of the nine-month bills to six
months. This last strategy is an example of a short
hedge. A short hedge involves selling interest rate
futures to protect the value of cash holdings of
interest-bearing securities or to fix borrowing costs,
The following example shows how a corporation
might use Eurodollar futures to fix a borrowing rate
on a future loan.
Overseas affiliates of multinational firms frequently
take out loans with borrowing costs tied to LIBOR.
Consider a firm that expects to need such a loan in a
month. The firm faces the risk that borrowing rates
may rise before the loan is taken out. The corporate
treasurer can hedge this risk by shorting Euro-
dollar futures. Since taking out a loan amounts
to selling an interest-bearing security, selling interest
rate futures contracts serves as a temporary substi-
tute for taking out the loan now and investing the
proceeds until the funds are needed. If interest rates
rise, the cost of satisfying delivery requirements for
the futures contract falls while the contracted delivery
price remains the same. The gain from the futures
position offsets increased borrowing costs.
Hedging Interest Rate Risk Financial intermedi-
aries, such as banks and securities dealers, fund their
holdings of earning assets largely through debt.
Traditionally, financial intermediaries have used
short-term sources of funds to finance holdings of
longer-term assets. This condition is described as a
positive gap. When an institution has a positive gap,
changes in interest rates affect funding costs faster
than asset returns. This means that any rise in
interest rates will hurt future earnings, while a fall
in rates produces windfall profits. The risk to net
earnings caused by changes in interest rates is termed
interest rate risk.
Financial intermediaries have begun to use interest
rate futures to hedge interest rate risk. A positive
gap can be hedged by either shortening the effective
maturity of asset holdings or by fixing future bor-
rowing rates. Readers interested in learning more
about gap hedging strategies are referred to Brewer
[1985], Kaufman [1984], and Kawaller [1983].
Risks Associated with Hedging
Risk of Margin Calls Hedgers, like all traders
who take on futures positions, face the risk of margin
calls. In the case of a hedging transaction, any de-
cline in the value of a futures position is normally
offset by gains from a cash position. Gains on the
cash position are typically not realized immediately,
however, while futures contracts are marked to mar-
ket at the end of each trading session. The practice
of marking futures contracts to market every day,
while helping to insure the financial integrity of
futures contracts, can place strains on a hedger’s cash
flow.
Liquidity Risk Although futures contracts are
more liquid than the underlying security as a general
rule, liquidity can be a problem in some markets. CD
futures provide a good example. As of September 4,
1986, trading volume in CD futures was zero while
total open interest was twenty-eight contracts. In
such a market, it can at times be literally impossible
to execute market orders for the purchase or sale of a
contract. Hedgers who venture into such markets
should be prepared to satisfy delivery requirements.
Liquidity can also be a problem for futures con-
tracts with delivery dates more than a year away.
Trading activity in futures contracts is heaviest in
contracts for the nearby delivery month. Trading in
the most distant contracts is typically very thin, indi-
cating that those markets are less liquid. Liquidity
can also be a problem for contracts a few days away
from settlement. Unless a hedger plans delivery, it is
best to either lift the hedge or roll it over (close out
the existing futures position and buy or sell another
futures contract) into the next contract delivery
month before the last week of trading in a contract.
12
The Role of Speculators
Speculators have been active participants in futures
markets since the earliest days of futures trading.
Futures markets have proven attractive to specu-
lators for at least two reasons. First, fractional
margin requirements permit speculators to effectively
leverage their positions to a greater degree than
might otherwise be possible. Second, lower trans-
action costs and greater liquidity make futures con-
tracts an attractive alternative to cash transactions
for speculators as well as hedgers.
12 Ronalds [1986] discusses contract life cycles for a
number of financial futures.
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accounts of market squeezes-attempts at price
manipulation effected by dumping or withholding
commodity supplies on futures delivery dates-and
traders who defaulted on their obligations when price
changes created losses. Most often, speculators were
blamed for these abuses. In addition, commodity
producers often held speculators responsible for de-
clines in commodity prices. These perceived specu-
lative abuses produced several attempts to ban futures
trading entirely.
13
In response to these events, the futures exchanges
devised ways to insure the orderly functioning of
futures markets. Delivery requirements were de-
signed so as to minimize the danger of market
squeezes.
14 Margin requirements and the daily
marking to market of contracts were adopted to
eliminate credit risk from futures contracts. Specu-
lators in futures markets are still sometimes blamed
for large price fluctuations; for the most part, how-
ever, they have come to be viewed as playing a useful
role in futures markets through their willingness to
assume price risk, thereby making the markets more
liquid for hedgers.
PRICE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FUTURES
AND CASH MARKETS
As a general rule futures prices tend to be highly
correlated with the spot price of the deliverable
security. All futures hedging strategies rely on this
price relationship: it is because futures and spot
prices are highly correlated that futures contracts can
serve as temporary substitutes for cash transactions.
Price relationships between futures and underlying
spot markets can be explained using arbitrage pricing
theory, which is based on the premise that two
different securities that can serve as perfect substi-
tutes should sell for the same price. To apply this
principle to the pricing of futures contracts, note that
buying a futures contract substitutes for buying and
holding the underlying security. Arbitrage pricing
13 Hieronymus [1971, chapter 4] tells of the arrest of
nine prominent members of the Chicago Board of Trade
following the enactment of the Illinois Elevator bill in
1867. That bill classified any contract for the sale of
grain for future delivery as gambling, except in cases
where the seller actually owned physical stocks of the
commodity being sold. The sections of the bill classi-
fying futures contracts as gambling were repealed in the
next session of the Illinois legislature, however, and the
exchange members never came to trial.
14 Paul [1985] discusses the design of contract settle-
ment provisions.
theory would thus predict that the futures price
should just equal the price of the underlying security
plus any net carrying costs.
The Cost of Carry Pricing Relation
The cost of financing and storing a commodity or
security until delivery is called the cost of curry.
For agricultural and other commodities cost of carry
includes financing costs, storage, and any transaction
costs. The convention in financial markets is to apply
the term net carrying cost to the difference between
any interest earned on the security and the cost of
borrowing to finance its purchase.
The cost of carry pricing relation holds that the
price of a futures contract should be determined by
the spot price plus net carrying costs. Formally, the
relation is given by
F=S+c,
where F is the market futures price, S is the current
spot price of the deliverable security, and c is the
cost of carry.
By definition, the difference between the futures
and spot price is basis. Thus, basis should theoreti-
cally be determined by the cost of carry when the
item being hedged is the same as the deliverable
security. Understanding the cost of carry model is
important in designing hedge strategies because it
allows the hedger to anticipate certain changes in
basis over the life of a hedge.
Convergence
Carrying costs fall as the futures settlement date
approaches because the time period a cash position
must be held grows shorter. This causes futures
prices to converge to underlying spot market prices
as the delivery date draws near. On the final day of
trading in a futures contract a futures transaction is
essentially equivalent to a spot transaction, so futures
prices should differ little from spot prices. Changes
in carrying costs can thus explain the phenomenon of
convergence. Because of convergence, basis tends to
decline systematically over the life of a hedge.
Cash and Carry Arbitrage
To see why futures prices should conform to the
cost of carry model, consider the arbitrage oppor-
tunities that would exist if they did not. Suppose,
for example, that the price of gold futures exceeded
the current spot price of gold plus the cost of carry.
Arbitragers could earn riskless profits by buying
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futures, and subsequently delivering the gold on the
futures settlement date. This type of transaction is
known as cash and carry arbitrage because it involves
buying the cash commodity and carrying it until the
futures delivery date.
If the futures price were below the spot price, arbi-
tragers would have the incentive to sell any cash
holdings of gold (or short gold in the cash market if
possible), buy gold futures, and then take delivery
to replenish inventories. In either case, arbitrage
activity should force futures prices to adjust to the
current spot price plus the cost of carry.
Now consider a cash and carry transaction in the
Treasury bill market. Applying the cost of carry
pricing relation to the pricing of bill futures is a
straightforward exercise because T-bills are discount
instruments that do not pay explicit interest. The
cost of carry (c) for a Treasury bill is therefore just
the interest expense associated with funding the pur-
chase of the bill over the period it is held. For the
sake of simplicity suppose that the next delivery date
for Treasury bill futures is exactly thirteen weeks
away. If the current futures price exceeds the cost
of buying a twenty-six-week-bill plus the carrying
cost for the thirteen-week holding period, arbitragers
can earn riskless profits by simultaneously buying
twenty-six-week bills, selling nearby Treasury bill
futures, and then delivering the bills when the con-
tracts mature. In the opposite case a profitable arbi-
trage would involve selling cash holdings of twenty-
six-week bills, buying Treasury bill futures, and
accepting delivery in thirteen weeks. A more detailed
description of how Treasury bill carrying costs are
determined follows.
The Implied Repo Rate
A repurchase agreement (more commonly called a
repo or RP) is a transaction involving the sale of a
security, usually a Treasury security, with a commit-
ment on the part of the seller to repurchase the
security after a stated length of time. Repurchase
agreements can be viewed as short-term loans col-
lateralized by securities holdings. The interest rate
paid by borrowers in the RP market is called the
repo rate. Because repurchase agreements are a pri-
mary funding source for dealers in government se-
curities, the Treasury bill repo rate is typically used
to calculate net carrying costs for Treasury bill
futures.
The implied repo rate (irr) is a measure of carry-
ing costs implicit in the futures-spot price relation-
ship. It is formally defined as the difference between
the invoice or delivery cost F implied by the futures
price and the current spot price S, converted to an
annualized rate of return. The formula for calcu-
lating the implied repo rate is
irr =
F-S 360 X .
S  t
The implied repo rate actually measures the rate of
return that could be earned by buying a Treasury
bill and simultaneously selling a futures contract
with a delivery date t days away. It measures implied
interest expense in the sense that it reveals the bor-
rowing rate at which the gross return to a cash and
carry arbitrage transaction would just equal the cost
of financing that transaction.
Comparing implied repo rates with actual rates
amounts to comparing theoretical futures prices, as
determined by the cost of carry model, with actual
futures prices. An implied repo rate above the actual
three-month repo rate would indicate that futures
contracts are relatively overpriced because implied
interest expense would be greater than actual interest
expense. An implied repo rate below the actual rate,
on the other hand, would indicate that futures con-
tracts are underpriced. Gendreau [1985] presents
indirect evidence suggesting that arbitrage keeps
actual and implied repo rates for Treasury bills in
alignment.
Two final observations are in order. First, the
effect that margin calls can have on anticipated finan-
cing costs has been ignored in this discussion; Stigum
[1983, chapter 14] and Kidder [1984] explain how
this affects the calculations. Second, although this
discussion has centered on applying implied repo
rate calculations to the pricing of Treasury bill
futures, the concept can also be applied to the pricing
of other types of futures contracts ; see Kidder
[1984] and Rebel1 [1984] for more examples.
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Richmond, P. O. Box 27622, Richmond, Virginia 23261.
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